The rapid pace of the ongoing fourth technological revolution is accompanied by the growth of new industries, one of which is the construction of data processing centers (further referred to as DPCs). Energy-intensive data centers that require maintaining a certain temperature are located up to the extreme points of the globe – the Arctic and the Antarctic. The Arctic states are attractive for locating data centers due to the relatively low cost of electricity and to the climatic conditions that help reduce cooling costs. In Antarctica, the anthropogenic activity grows because we need to research its regions and popularize polar tourism. This also requires the creation of new data centers and the laying of deep-sea cables for operational communication and timely data transmission.

The vulnerability of the Arctic and Antarctic regions to anthropogenic emissions is a well-known fact, and an array of international legal acts are devoted to protecting their environment. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that in the 21st century, not all states that have acceded to its conventions and declarations are sufficiently complying with their obligations. In particular, this is related to the implementation of the objectives of the EU Law on Critical Raw Materials, such as the independence of its member states from third countries in the provision of extractable resources1. There is an additional factor indicating a decrease in the effectiveness of international law on land use change in the Arctic countries: it is the violation of the rights of the indigenous peoples under the auspice of the critical need for mining required for the developing digital technologies and the transition to green energy. The vague formulations and criteria of current legal regulations make it possible to implement political decisions that go against the will of the indigenous peoples, even in those countries where they enjoy relative autonomy guaranteed at the constitutional level (Živojinović et al., 2024).

The above defines the article objective – to provide a critical assessment of the effectiveness of existing international legal norms under the new challenges of technological progress. This objective is achieved by identifying risk groups specific to the Arctic states and the Antarctic; analyzing general and special international legal acts; determining the role of these territories in ensuring the data centers development and operation; and identifying risks directly related to the growth of the data center industry in their regions. The main purpose of the study is to call for the development of special international measures that can offset the negative impact of new types of anthropogenic activity in the territories on which the climatic well-being of all humankind depends. The article calls for the development of uniform certification and reporting requirements for the entire lifespan of a data center, including accompanying industries. The author also calls for establishing liability violations, given the specifics of the environmental safety, cultural and social features of these territories.

Under the global climatic changes, The Arctic and Antarctic are the zones of specific economic risks. Temperature rise results in rapid warming of the polar regions, provoking ice thinning, sea ice and eternal frost melting and causing negative consequences far beyond their boundaries (Raimondi et al., 2024). The consequences include disturbance of climatic and geochemical cycles leading to not only the loss of biological diversity and animals’ habitat, but also social-economic degradation of the arctic regions’ population. Moreover, today the point of no return may have been reached, which means the humankind may face “a cascade of unfavorable consequences” for the whole planet2. According to the research under Horizon 2020 project held by University of Bergen, the Arctic is most acutely influenced by the global warming caused by human activity. In the Arctic Ocean, acidification due to greenhouse emissions is progressing 10 times, and warming – two times faster than anywhere in the world. This testifies to passing the point of no return as an actual fact3. For example, together with the increased carbon dioxide (CO2) content in the atmosphere and temperature growth, seasonal fluctuations of partial carbon dioxide (pCO2) grow, as well as the changes in water hydrogen index (pH). This increases the summer acidification of the ocean, which may reduce the endemic sea organisms’ resistance to higher summer temperatures (flying snails, copepods, polar cod, etc.). These organisms are the key link between zooplankton and sea mammals, sea birds and other fishes (Orr et al., 2022). Increased CO2 emissions is the primary cause of the water surface absorbing the anthropogenic carbon (Cant), which, in turn, is the main factor of the open ocean acidification (Terhaar et al., 2020). At the same time, the share of oxygen (O2) determines the safety of sea ecosystems, sensitive to the interconnected processes of warming, acidification, deoxygenation4 (reduced oxygen level), decreased nutrients and primary production5. Scientists also point to the so called polar amplification – the proved fact that the Arctic warms faster than the rest of the globe. Recent research demonstrate that from 1979 to 2021 this process was almost four times faster than anywhere else. This indicates that earlier forecasts of the global warming speed (two times faster than in other regions) were not accurate, insufficiently evaluating the situation on the recent 43 years. Since the start of satellite observations, certain regions in the Eurasian sector of the Arctic Ocean warmed up to seven times faster than the globe, while the overall temperature growth in the Arctic was almost four times faster than in other territories during the same period (Rantanen et al., 2022). The factors of climate change in the Arctic are also globalization and digitalization. The territory contains deposits of mineral resources, which are necessary for the “green shift” – the transition to renewable energy sources. As the European Union strives for zero emissions of carbon dioxide by 2050, their excavation (for production of solar panels, wind turbines, automobile accumulators, etc.) continues to grow. This entails irreversible impacts on the environment and landscape and causes alarm (and sometimes social tension) among the local population (Živojinović et al., 2024). Positive aspects of the industrial development of these territories include infrastructure development, new jobs, increased income of the local population and higher tax revenues. However, there are also risks of disappearance of traditional industries and other elements of national cultures, which leads to the loss of cultural identity (Živojinović et al., 2024). Indeed, the development of new types of land use, including excavation of raw materials for the “green shift” and other purposes, electric energy production, construction of roads and other infrastructure are the drivers of negative changes in traditional deer breeding in Fennoscandia (according to 60 % of respondents in a poll held within an Artic Hub project) (Turunen et al., 2024). Given the current geopolitical situation, mining causes more and more disputes – on the one hand, the EU strives for self-provision with all necessary mineral resources. On the other hand, fundamental rights of the residents, as well as the research ethics, may be violated. This indicates further exacerbation of the “war for resources” not only among countries but also between states and population of the Arctic. The latter is more and more unsatisfied by turning their lands into “Eldorado for large companies” and by perceived lack of state defense of their legal rights and interests (Suopajärvi et al., 2024). It should be understood that the mentioned phenomena are not a problem of the future generations. In particular, meteorological observations in the Icelandic Westfjords show that the climate started to change quicker in the few recent years. Before the end of the century, this arctic state will face the corresponding changes of the physical and anthropogenic environment, and the speed of these changes depend on reduction of anthropogenic emissions (Bannan et al., 2022). Scientists more and more often mark the correlation between the Arctic temperature rise and increased appeals for psychological help among the local population. The latter develop “ecological anxiety”, exacerbation of solastalgia and psychological states such as “climatic and environmental grief”. These are reactions to the global negative changes in the environment, including those associated with changes in land use (construction of mines, railroads, wind power stations, etc.), and the lack of power in making ecological decisions when their rights are restricted by policies (Markkula et al., 2024). This is also about safety – the eternal frost is a reservoir of biological, chemical and radioactive materials; hence, the ongoing melting leads to wakening of the ancient, often unknown primitive organisms. This increases the risk of biological danger, including beyond the Arctic (Ali et al., 2024). Besides, the melting of the eternal frost, including the underwater one in the sea, may cause emissions of another greenhouse gas – methane (CH4), contained in the natural sources of the region (wetlands, fresh water systems, gas hydrates, etc.) and produced as the soil humidity rises (Parmentier et al., 2024). Together with the increased frequency of extreme weather phenomena, these negative factors have already led to mass loss of flora and fauna, caused changes in migration of birds and fishes, led to disturbance of coastal social-economic systems and reduction (and sometimes complete elimination) of fish and other sea resources (Pecuchet et al., 2025). In the context of health of the Arctic population and wild nature, it is necessary to mention the ongoing pollution of the region with mercury (Hg)6.

The term “the point of no return” started being used in relation to the Antarctic too. This is the ice shield of the planet, containing over 60 % of the world stock of fresh water. Climate changes lead to ice melting, ice shelf disintegration and, as a consequence, to increased ocean level7. Splitting of ice masses leads to water mixing and redistribution of warmth in the ocean, disturbing delivery of nutrients into the euphotic zone. This violates the stability of the ocean’s upper layer, hence, the availability of light necessary for plankton, influencing the CO2 absorption (Meredith et al., 2022). Experiments show that with the temperature growth, the speed of ice melting increases, which will lead to the fast desalination of the continental shelf (Mathiot & Jourdain, 2023). In Antarctic, these phenomena are not due to greenhouse gases emissions on its territory, but are the result of global changes in the atmosphere and ocean. They go with the same speed as, for example, in Greenland, where such connection is established. This does not make the climatic forecast more optimistic, however. Modeling demonstrates that, with the current policy preserved, the sea level will rise not less than by 42 cm (Edwards et al., 2021). The negative influence on the continent’s climate is produced also by extreme temperature phenomena (heat waves and sea heat waves), which may provoke a cascade of extreme events, such as a record temperature rise in the East Antarctic caused by an atmospheric river or a complete disintegration of a shelf Conger Glacier in 2022 (Siegert et al., 2023). The Antarctic lack local population, but its territories are influenced by anthropogenic activity related to science and tourism (appearance of non-local flora and fauna, mobilization of pollutants from waste deposits due to ice melting, etc.) (Hughes et al., 2021). Researchers call for paying attention to the lack of the necessary norms and criteria to assess pollution caused by increased human activity (Bargagli & Rota, 2024).

The United Nations (further referred to as the UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development A/RES/70/1, within the list of Sustainable Development Goals (further referred to as the SDGs), highlights the need to take urgent measures to combat climate change and its consequences. This cannot be achieved without fulfilling the commitments made by developed countries – parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (further referred to as the UNFCCC), to accomplish joint mobilization (Goal #13)8, which underlies all environmental standards. These include: reporting on anthropogenic emissions; development of climatic change mitigation programs; promotion and cooperation in the field of technologies for minimizing anthropogenic emissions; cooperation in taking preparatory measures to adapt to the climatic change; taking into account the considerations related to climatic change in the implementation of the relevant social, economic and environmental policies and measures; promotion and cooperation in the comprehensive, open and prompt exchange of scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and legal information related to the climatic system and climatic change; implementation of national policies and appropriate measures by developed countries to mitigate the effects of climatic change by limiting their anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and protecting and improving the quality of their sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases; provision of new and additional financial resources to cover all agreed costs caused by the Convention fulfillment by developing countries and other obligations provided for in Art. 49. A number of agreements have also been signed within the UNFCCC framework, including:

The general international framework for the protection of environmental safety and the rights of indigenous peoples in the polar regions also includes:

The list also includes international legal tools adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), such as the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships MARPOL 73/78 (aimed at combating ocean pollution), the International Safety Code for Ships Using Gases or Other Fuels with a Low Flash Point (MGT Code 2017), the International Convention on the Control and Management of Marine Ballast Water and Sediments (2004), etc. IMO is also developing medium-term measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from ships and the use of hydrogen and ammonia as marine fuels28.

Given the strategic, social, economic and climatic features of the polar regions, an extensive multi-level international legal framework has been formed to ensure security on their territory. Besides general international legal framework for ensuring environmental safety and protecting the rights and legitimate interests of indigenous peoples, a whole range of international acts has been developed. They are aimed at modifying national legislation, developing comprehensive international cooperation, and increasing transparency in the field of anthropogenic emissions in the Arctic and Antarctic. For this study, the main special international legal acts that ensure security in these regions are:

17.The Helsinki Declaration on Climate Change in Antarctica (2023). It recognized that if CO2 emissions remain at current levels, the atmosphere and oceans will continue to heat up and the oceans – to acidify. The Declaration once again confirmed that mining for any purpose other than scientific research is prohibited on the continent, and stated the need to jointly study the impact of global climate change on Antarctica, as well as the role of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean in regulating the global climate and future rise of sea level46.

The central organization for cooperation in the Arctic is the Arctic Council (further referred to as the AC), established in 1996 by the Arctic states (Russia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Canada). Its goals are environmental protection and sustainable development of the region47. The AC, as an intergovernmental forum, includes six permanent participants representing the interests of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic: the Aleutian International Association, the Athabaskan Arctic Council, the International Gwich’in Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Sami Union, and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North. The AC also has special working groups, such as the AMAR International Charitable Foundation, which assesses the state of the Arctic environment, and PAME, conducting policy research and developing measures to protect the marine environment48. In addition to the AC, the operating organizations are: 1) The International Barents Secretariat, established under the Agreement between the governments of Finland, Norway, the Russian Federation and Sweden to develop cooperation in the Barents/Euro-Arctic region49; 2) Barents/Euro-Arctic Region Council (BEAC), established in 1998 to maintain cooperation in the field of environmental protection and improve the situation of the indigenous population of the North50; 3) the Barents Regional Council (BRC), which is an independent multilateral cooperation body of 13 administrative-territorial entities of the Barents region, comprising their leaders and representatives of indigenous peoples (Sami, Veps and Nenets) 51; 4) an independent Working group on indigenous peoples with the status of a permanent advisory body to the BEAC and the BRC52. To date, the Russian Federation has denounced the Agreements between the governments of Finland, Norway, the Russian Federation and Sweden on the establishment of the International Barents Secretariat for the Development of Cooperation in the Barents/Euro-Arctic region (Decree of the Russian Government No. 921-p dated 04/16/202553) and was excluded from the BEAC, which Finland also left54.

In Antarctica, the role of a special international body is performed by the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, which has established an Environmental Protection Committee. The functions of the latter are to present considerations and formulate recommendations to the parties in connection with the implementation of the Protocol on Environmental Protection, including the operation of its Annexes, for consideration at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (Article 11 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection)55.

Over the past few years, a number of successful projects have been implemented in the Arctic to locate data processing centers (further referred to as DPCs). The latter appear to be a new type of critical infrastructure. The main reason for their location was the abundant reserves of electricity, including green one, and its low price, coupled with a cold climate, fiber-optic connectivity, and reasonable land prices (Saunavaara & Laine, 2021). For example, Iceland is positioning itself as an ideal location for DPC construction due to its cheap green energy and strives to become the largest data center operator in the Nordic countries56. Indeed, assessing its prospects for the DPC industry development, the KPMG international audit and consulting corporation highlighted such advantages as the possibility of using natural cooling (ventilation systems without additional coolers) and fairly low electricity prices (while energy consumption in Iceland increased by 75 % on average over a five-year period in 2018)57. The growth of requests for the construction and expansion of existing DPCs continues along with an increase in projects using AI technologies and the amount of data that needs to be processed. In particular, Verne in Iceland owns a DPC using hydro and geothermal energy. According to the company, it “does not cause any damage to the planet”, but uses liquid cooling technologies58. It is noteworthy that Verne does not specify on its official page which type of liquid cooling is used – indirect water, immersion using a special mineral oil or some other technology. The Kolos data center, which was supposed to be located in the Arctic, in Norwegian Ballangen, also deserves attention. It was planned but never built due to changes in Norwegian legislation regarding miners. Claimed to be the largest in the world, it would be located on 600,000 square meters and use climate cooling, operating on hydroenergy59. In an effort to promote transparency and increase trust, the Norwegian Association of the Data Center Industry (Norsk Datasenterindustri) presented a report on DPCs for 2023–2024. It once again emphasized that the growth of this industry is due to digitalization and the widespread introduction of artificial intelligence, which causes additional CO2 emissions (in 2024, these emissions were 12 times higher in the UK and Germany than in Norway). The report confirmed the importance of data centers for the country’s economy and recalled that this industry was brought under control through amendments to the Law “On Electronic Communications”60. Finland, which hosted the Meta61 data center, is not far behind. In particular, one of their data centers, which processes huge amounts of data, is located in Lulea, Lapland. According to the company, the goal of zero CO2 emissions was achieved there by using “clean and renewable energy” and a strategy of adding renewable energy sources to the local network. Moreover, the company claimed that it would “restore more water than consume” by 203062.

In Russia, both non-profit and commercial data centers also continue to grow. Technological modules with a total capacity of 4,000 devices with a capacity of 16 MWatt will soon be placed directly above the Arctic Circle on a land plot of 15,000 square meters. These are part of a data center owned by Intelion Sever, a resident of the Russian Arctic zone63. To avoid the impact of sanctions, the state-owned Rosatom Corporation is also planning to launch a data center in the Murmansk oblast. It will be based on the Kola Nuclear Power Plant, where about 20–25 % of electricity remains unclaimed, while the cold climate makes it possible not to install cooling systems, also reducing electricity consumption64. A Russian hosting provider RUVDS went even further and in 2024 launched a modular data center on a drifting ice floe, directly next to the North Pole. It was powered by diesel generators, as part of an experiment that was completed within a month due to the appearance of a crack on the ice floe65. RUVDS has planned a similar project for 2025, but this time the data center will be located at the South Pole66.

Chile, which is also striving to become a country that attracts data center operators, plans to extend underwater cables to the last of the continents deprived of them, to the Antarctic. The Antarctic SMART Cable, with almost unlimited bandwidth, is to connect Antarctica’s largest research center to either the American McMurdo Station, or New Zealand’s Invercargill, or Australia’s Sydney. This would improve current and future Antarctic research and create the opportunity for stable interaction for scientists and staff67.

The first group of risks associated with the construction of data centers in the Arctic states and the Antarctic certainly comprises the risks of their negative impact on the environment. The Norwegian research center SINTEF Energi AS draws attention to the fact that when electric power is used to cool the data center (air cooling of data processors), an excessive amount of heat is generated at a temperature of 40–50 °C. This temperature increases up to 60-80 °C if more efficient cooling systems are used (liquid or two-phase, in which the liquid refrigerant evaporates in a cold plate heat exchanger). In both cases, this excess heat is usually not used in any way; moreover, CO2 emissions from data centers already account for at least 2 % of the global total, which is equivalent to damage from the aviation industry68. Excess heat, if it has a sufficiently high temperature, can be used to heat buildings and for other industrial and household purposes, as is done, for example, in Sweden (Yuan et al., 2023). However, today excess heat is most often released into the atmosphere, which, for example, is noticed by PivIT Global specialists (a data center maintenance and repair company). They remind that excess heat cannot be used to heat houses and buildings if the data center is located in a remote and/or sparsely populated region. Moreover, such disposal requires the creation of an expensive infrastructure69. In addition to excess heat, greenhouse gases such as CO2, CH4 and N2O (nitrous oxide) are released into the atmosphere. This is directly related to the operation and construction of data centers, where leaks of refrigerants used in cooling systems pose a particular threat to the environment. One must not forget about the use of diesel generators running if the main electricity is disconnected or during equipment testing, which occurs on a regular basis. There is also enormous consumption of water, given that most operating data centers use evaporative cooling, which releases heat into the environment (Thangam et al., 2024). For example, according to official data provided in a Google report, the total amount of greenhouse emissions associated with their activities increased by 48% in 2023 alone compared to 201970. Independent investigations results look even less optimistic. The British Guardian presents its own analysis, according to which emissions from data centers owned by such technology giants as Google, Microsoft, Meta71 and Apple from 2020 to 2022 could be 662% higher than officially registered ones; the underestimation is the result of imperfect accounting and certification systems72.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that technologies are developing faster than their legal regulation, for example, in Norway73. In an attempt to bring the data centers under control, the Norwegian legislator supplemented Articles 3–7 of the Law “On Electronic Communications”. Now they stipulate mandatory registration of data center operators and a recommendation to use “the best available technical solutions, recognized standards, cost and usefulness of the measures applied”74. Assumingly, the following generally recognized standards and certificates applicable to DPCs are meant:

At the same time, there is a trend in national legislations to mitigate the requirements. For example, the US plans to ease environmental restrictions for data centers in certain federal areas, where special power plants working on natural gas will be built. The latter will service massive data centers that consume at least 1 GW of electricity (the amount of energy consumed by a city with a population of 10,000,000 people) 87. The corresponding order was signed by President Joe Biden in January 202588. Russia is in the legal vanguard in this field. The Code of Rules 541.1325800.2024 “Buildings and structures of data processing centers. Design Rules” was adopted by the Russian Ministry of Construction to ensure compliance with the Federal Law No. 384-FZ dated December 30, 2009 “Technical Regulations on the Safety of Buildings and Structures”. It complies with the requirements of Federal Laws No. 123-FZ dated July 22, 2008 “Technical Regulations on Fire Safety Requirements” and No. 261-FZ dated November 23, 2009 “On Energy Conservation and Energy Efficiency Improvement and on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation”. It also established mandatory general requirements for compliance with sanitary, epidemiological and environmental norms for the protection of human health, environment and adjacent buildings, energy saving and safety, and to basic engineering and technical systems of electrical and cold supply89.

Environmental risks include land-use changes related to the construction, operation and provision of data centers with electricity. The construction of a data center and related infrastructure involves deforestation of large areas, as well as intake of water, often drinking water, which can lead to irreversible environmental consequences (Thangam et al., 2024). Green energy also involves active intervention in the natural landscape, from installing wind turbines and solar panels to drilling deep wells. This is done in Iceland, for example, where demand for electricity is higher than it can offer. The country developed the Icelandic Deep Drilling Project (IDDP), which implies increasing the number of deep wells in order to increase geothermal energy production90.

Finally, projects for the construction of deep-sea marine cables also involve environmental risks. The entire life cycle of such a cable, including installation, maintenance and decommissioning, is associated with environmental impacts. These include: disturbance of the species’ habitat, chemical and noise pollution, changes in electromagnetic fields, heat generation and other types of environmental damage (Taormina et al., 2018). It would be unfair to say that the laying and operation of deep-sea cables are not regulated in any way; nevertheless, both national and international laws pay much more attention to the cables protection than to environmental protection in the areas where they are laid. For example, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention in the Law of the Sea (1982) gives all countries the right to lay underwater cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, provided that “reasonable measures are taken to explore the continental shelf, exploit its natural resources, and prevent, reduce, and control pollution”. It also obliges them to take into account previously laid cables and pipelines so as not to impair capabilities for their repair and maintenance91. The provisions of this Article serve as the basis of, for example, the internal US regulation. It this country, the National Association for Safety at Sea is responsible for issuing permits for laying underwater cables, including permits for placing underwater cables on the territories of national marine reserves92.

The second group of risks associated with the growth of the data center industry in the Arctic states are social risks. Extraction of metals and minerals necessary for the data center operation, direct development and associated logging, construction of roads on pastures and lands of cultural value to the indigenous peoples living there, construction of hydro and other power plants – all this is a continuation of operational practices, including in relation to the Sami living in the Arctic regions. The legal protection of their pastures, as well as the realization of their rights as an indigenous people, is often only nominal and is reduced to zero with the growing demand for green electricity and the construction of data centers. At the same time, the Sami once again experience such legacy of the past as land seizures and even forced resettlement. A bright example is the previously mentioned data center in Lulea, located on the pasture of Sami reindeer herders. Its construction was not even discussed with them93. The United Nations has already drawn attention to this problem, calling for the rights of indigenous peoples to be taken into account when developing deposits of “critically important minerals” associated with deforestation, water and soil pollution, loss of biodiversity and forced relocation of the indigenous population94. Promises to create a large number of jobs in places where indigenous peoples live and in remote areas of DPCs location are also not always true – instead of 30,000 jobs in Lulea, only 56 were created95. Other local residents also face deteriorating living conditions. Among the reasons are rising prices – for example, in Norway, which is attractive for its cheap and excess electricity, greenhouses in a number of regions were to be closed due to rising electricity prices96. All this leads to a rise of protests against the data centers construction around the world and, of course, in Northern Europe as their concentration point. Citizens believe that their rights and legitimate interests are violated, the quality of life is decreasing, and land is given to foreign technology companies as a priority97.

The research results demonstrate that the construction of data centers and the development of the industry accompanying their operation and maintenance in the Arctic and Antarctic are associated with specific risks. The latter are determined by their geographical location, vulnerability of biological diversity and the ethnic composition of the population. These risks are divided into two main groups: environmental and social. Environmental risks are associated with the fact that the pace and scale of the occurring changes do not allow local ecological systems to adapt in a timely manner, and future changes cannot be adequately quantified (Robinson, 2022). At the same time, the slightest temperature fluctuations in their regions, as well as an increase in anthropogenic activity, can cause a chain reaction of irreversible climatic, sociological and economic changes throughout the planet98. Thus, the biological, food and physical security of humanity is at risk. Social risks are associated with industrial development and land-use changes in the Arctic countries, namely with the ineffective implementation of the indigenous peoples’ rights (the right to land, the right to health and a safe environment, the right to a decent life, the right to preserve and develop their own culture, etc.)99. In the scientific literature, this approach has already been called “green imperialism”, i.e. the development of climate strategies in the interests of global elites with further marginalization of vulnerable communities. This implies the aggravation of centuries-old inequality and historical injustice. A striking example is the extraction of rare earth minerals and metals for the “green shift”, disproportionately affecting the territories inhabited by indigenous peoples (Boretti, 2025). In the future, it may lead to new local and international conflicts. Today, we are already witnessing the territorial ambitions of the United States towards Greenland – a self-governing autonomy within the Danish Kingdom, the main population of which is Inuit.

The analysis of the international legal framework has revealed that, despite a large amount of declarations, conventions and agreements, it lacks specific acts to meet the current challenges of the new technological revolution. The latter requires increased mining, construction of modular and massive data centers, and laying of deep-sea cables. The Arctic territories are becoming increasingly attractive for that, while the Antarctic is turning into a center of scientific research on climate change. This, paradoxically, is associated with the growing harmful anthropogenic impact on the continent regions. Further industrial and anthropogenic development of the territories of the Arctic states and Antarctica will have global environmental and social consequences. At the same time, the national legislation shows low effectiveness in leveling the risks identified in this article. We can conclude that there is an urgent need to establish international regulation of the development of the data center industry in the Arctic and Antarctic. This system of regulation must include uniform requirements for certification and reporting, as well as responsibility for violations, taking into account the specifics of the environmental safety of these territories, their cultural and social characteristics.

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